Manual / Guide · 2009
Full: history, models, mechanics, circuit diagrams, wheel wiring, accessories, NVA key procedure, repair (144 pp.; free since 2021)
ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ FIALKA M-125 Detailed description of the Russian Fialka cipher machines by Paul Reuvers & Marc Simons with contributions by David Hamer Ph.D. & Tom Perera Ph.D. Version 2.0 - 22 June 2009 First published 2005 Reference Manual 1 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ Acknowledgements The authors wish to thank the following people and organisations: • Tom Perera Ph.D. [4] for his research, the many pictures, his patience, the rotor mechnism and proof-reading of this manual. Lots of information can be found on his website http://w1tp.com/enigma/ • David Hamer Ph.D. [5] for his early research of Fialka machines in the USA and the 3K wheel wiring. His website is at http://home.comcast.net/~dhhamer/ • Joerg Drobick [3] for his advice, historical facts, excellent website and proof-reading of this manual. • Daniel Kula (CZ) for translation and explanation of some Russian key words and additional wiring information. • Mr. Chernov V. V. from Russia for his wonderful Fialka Simulators for Windows®, based on this manual. • Günter Hütter for his research on key-cards for the card reader and his replica key-cards. • Hans Pewsdorf for allowing us to take pictures of the interior of a GAZ-66 and granting access to his documentation for the R-142 radio set. • Immo Hahn for providing some special Fialka tools. • Klaus Copacz for help with the Polish Power Supply. • The people who have saved these wonderful machines from demolition. Disclaimer Although every effort has been made to ensure that the information presented in this document is correct, this cannot be guaranteed. The authors of this document cannot be held responsable for any loss or damage, direct or indirect, arising from the use or missuse of the information in this document. Furthermore, the authors cannot guarantee the suitability of the information for any purpose whatsoever. The information presented here, is indended for educational purposes and for historical research. The use of this information and/or the equipment described herein, may be subject to local law and is entirely at the readers own risk. © Copyright 2005-2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a database or retrieval system, or published, in any form or any way, electronically, mechanically, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other means without prior written permission from the publisher. © Copyright 2005-2009, PAHJ Reuvers & MJH Simons Le Sage ten Broeklaan 7, 5315 CP Eindhoven, The Netherlands. Phone: +31 (0)40 2486161. http://www.xat.nl/fialka/ [email protected] ISBN 978-90-79991-01-3 2 Fialka M-125 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ Contents Preface 7 1 The Fialka Cipher Machine 9 1.1 1.2 Introduction History 1.2.1 Introduction 1.2.2 Breaking Fialka 1.2.3 Improvements of Fialka 1.2.4 Fialka security procedures 1.2.5 Fialka keys and key procedures 1.2.6 Fialka in case of war 1.2.7 The GAZ-66 and the R-142 Radio Set 1.2.8 The R-142 Radio Set 1.2.9 Fialka and the R-142 Radio Set 11 12 12 12 13 13 14 15 16 17 18 1.3 1.4 Terminology used in this manual Identifying a Fialka machine 1.4.1 Introduction 1.4.2 Establishing the model 1.4.3 Establishing the serial number 1.4.4 Identifying the wheels 1.4.5 Establishing the wheel series 20 22 22 22 23 24 25 1.5 Controls & Connections 1.5.1 Fialka M-125 model 1.5.2 Fialka M-125-3 model 1.5.3 Fialka interior 1.5.4 Fialka Power Supply 26 26 28 30 31 1.6 1.7 Checklist Accessories 1.7.1 Introduction 1.7.2 Crank 1.7.3 Metal triangle 1.7.4 Power Supply 1.7.5 Paper tape holder 1.7.6 Spare wheel set in container 1.7.7 Test reflector 1.7.8 Additional print head(s) 1.7.9 Chad box 1.7.10 Toolkit 1.7.11 Wheel Opening Tool 32 35 35 35 35 36 39 40 41 41 42 43 44 2 Using the Fialka 45 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 Introduction Check the drum Check whether the mechanism is blocked Safety first Connecting the power supply Turning the Fialka on for the first time 47 47 48 48 49 50 Reference Manual 3 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ 2.7 2.8 4 Using the copy-holder Loading paper tape into the printer/puncher 2.8.1 Loading the standard 17.5 mm paper tape 2.8.2 Loading the special 10mm paper tape 2.8.3 Printer alignment 51 52 52 52 53 2.9 Five-letter groups 2.10 The Counters 2.11 Setting up the key 2.11.1 The Daily Key 2.11.2 The Message Key 2.11.3 The Indicator Book for Common Traffic 2.11.4 Changing the key 53 54 55 55 56 57 57 3 Detailed description 59 3.1 3.2 Introduction Keyboard 3.2.1 Introduction 3.2.2 Standard keyboard layout 3.2.3 Keyboard letter mapping 3.2.4 Special characters 3.2.5 Notes on the German keyboard layout 3.2.6 Different keyboard layouts 3.2.7 Key legend 3.2.8 Text Mode 3.2.9 Numbers-only mode 3.2.10 Mixed Mode 3.2.11 Testing the print head movement in Midex Mode (C) 61 63 63 64 64 64 65 66 68 68 69 69 69 3.3 Wheels 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.3.4 3.3.5 3.3.6 3.3.7 3.3.8 Introduction Removing the wheels Fixed versus Adjustable wheels Disassembling an adjustable wheel Ring-setting and core-selection Wheel wiring Wheel stepping Test reflector 70 70 71 72 73 73 74 76 80 3.4 Printer & Puncher 3.4.1 Introduction 3.4.2 Ink ribbon auto-reverse 3.4.3 The printer 3.4.4 The print head(s) 3.4.5 The print head lifter 3.4.6 Print head layout of the M-125 3.4.7 Error detection 3.4.8 Print head layout of the M-125-3 3.4.9 Replacing the print head 3.4.10 Printer & Puncher control switch 81 81 82 82 83 83 84 84 85 86 86 3.5 3.6 3.7 The digital 5-bit code Card Reader Sequence of Events 87 88 90 Fialka M-125 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ 4 Technical details & Circuit Diagrams 91 4.1 Introduction 4.1.1 Enigma 4.1.2 Block diagram of the M-125 4.1.3 Block diagram of the M-125-3 4.1.4 Negative logic 4.1.5 Symbols 4.1.6 Location of the various circuits 93 93 94 95 96 96 96 4.2 External Power Supply 4.2.1 Introduction 4.2.2 Circuit Description 4.2.3 The alternative Power Supply 4.2.4 TEMPEST 4.2.5 Fialka and TEMPEST 97 97 97 98 98 98 4.3 4.4 Power Module Keyboard 4.4.1 The switch-array 4.4.2 Circuit Description 4.4.3 Mechanical 5-bit Encoder 4.4.4 Auto-repeat 4.4.5 Tape Reader 99 100 100 101 102 102 102 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 MODE Switch Card Reader Entry Disc NumLock Switch Magic Circuit Reflector The 5-bit Encoder (Diode Matrix) Printer Driver Connectors 103 107 109 110 113 115 117 118 119 5 Hints & Tips 127 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 Introduction Power Supply or cable(s) missing No sign of life when power is turned on One of the fuses is missing The printer mechanism is damaged Replacing the ink ribbon Oil and Grease Adjusting the motor speed Creating your own key cards 5.9.1 Key cards 5.6.2 Test triangle 129 129 131 132 133 134 135 135 136 136 137 Appendix A - References Appendix B - Glossery of terms Reference Manual 139 141 5 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ Foreword to the 2nd edition In this new 2nd edition many chapters have been enhanced and new information has been added. Furthermore, new and better photographs and a number of new detailed drawings have been added. Detailed information about the use of Fialka in the R-142 radio set, the setup procedure for the daily key and message key, and information about the advanced Polish power supply are now included as well. 6 Fialka M-125 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ Preface I first heard of the Russian Fialka Cipher machine in 2003, when someone told me that a limited number of these machines had become available for sale. But it wasn't until mid-2005 when the first machines became publicly available to collectors. The Fialka attracted my attention, mainly because it appeared to be a close relative of the Enigma cipher machine that had 'infected' me with the crypto-virus a few years earlier. Furthermore, the Fialka was designed, built and used in an era of great tension and threat between east and west, also known as the cold-war. A mainly technical war, that had been the subject of many books, films, documentaries, protest demonstrations and, of course, our lessons at school. With the fall of the iron curtain in 1989, all this changed instantly. We gradually came to know our former 'enemy' and learned about their technological skills and achievements. In the past 10 - 20 years, a lot of Russian civilian and military equipment has become available to collectors and the likes, mainly in the form of Russian military radios. Cipher machines have always been a rare-find and the Fialka is no exception to this rule, not least because it still isn't officially declassified by the Russian authorities. As there was no technical information available about this machine when I started writing this paper, I decided to reverseengineer it, in order to find out exactly how it works and to make this information publicly available. A good starting point was the website of Professor Tom Perera in the USA [4] who, together with well-known Enigma researcher David Hamer [5], had already worked out the wiring of the wheels of the Polish Fialka machines. His website contained a large number of detailed images of each part of the machine which appeared to be of great help. But the real breakhrough came when Tom provided me with a partly disassembled drum mechanism of a defective Fialka machine, which he allowed me to take apart. I subsequently spent many weekends, evenings and nights tracing each and every wire in the machine, until I finally got a good insight in the machine's inner secrets and was able to draw the full circuit diagram. When I started this research project, I had no idea about what I would find and who I would meet. One of the great advantages of our modern age is the internet, which makes your world a lot larger and yet brings it much closer to you. As I published the intermediate results of our research on my website, I was contacted by numerous people all over the world, giving their support and offering new information on the subject. These contacts have been, and still are, a tremendous help. Without them, this manual would not be what it is today. Furthermore, I have the feeling that I've aquired many new friends, although I've never actually met the majority of them. This manual is an attempt to explain the technical and operational backgrounds of the Russian Fialka machines, which are – in my opinion – great examples of the Russian technological skills during the cold-war. The machines are very wellbuilt and are highly compact. Besides a 10-wheel coding machine, it also contains a text printer, a 5-bit tape puncher and a tape reader, all in a single machine which is actually a lot smaller than the western teletype machines of the same era. All in all, it's a wonderful piece of history. I hope you'll experience the same enthousiasm when reading this paper as I did when writing it. January 2006, Paul Reuvers Reference Manual 7 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ 8 Fialka M-125 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ Chapter 1 The Fialka Cipher Machine Reference Manual 9 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ 10 Fialka M-125 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ 1.1 Introduction Fialka is a Russian word that means 'Violet', which can be either a colour (purple) or a flower. Around 1965, the Russian Army introduced a brand new cipher machine, which was given the codename FIALKA. Two versions of this machine are known to exist: the M-125-xx and the M-125-3xx, with country-specific variants of each model. In principle, the machine is called M-125, whereas Fialka is the name of the cipher procedure but, as the machine is now commonly called Fialka, we will use that name throughout this manual. The design of the Fialka is largely based on the well-known Enigma machine, that was used by the German Forces during WWII. Like the Enigma, it uses a number of coding wheels to scramble the letters typed on the keyboard. With each key-press, the wheels move into a new position, thereby effectively changing the alphabet-substitution for each letter typed on the keyboard. And that's where the similarity with the Enigma ends. Rather than presenting the output on a lamp panel, the Fialka prints the coded letter directly onto a paper tape. At the same time it can punch the letter into the same paper tape in a 5-bit digital code, much like the baudot code of a teletype machine. In addition, the Fialka contains a paper tape transmitter which can be used to transmit or duplicate a message. The Russians have clearly learned from the flaws in the Enigma's design and its operating procedures, as they've implemented the following improvements: • 10 wheels, rather than 3 or 4 on the Enigma, • More frequent wheel turn-overs, • Adjacent wheels move in opposite directions, • Wheel wiring can be changed (i.e. mixed and/or mirrored) in the field (from 1978 onwards), • A punch card is used to replace the Steckerbrett (allowing daily change of letter-substitution), • A letter can be encoded into itself (which was impossible on Enigma, making is vulnerable to breaks). In addition to this, the following extra features are available: • The machine can be set to use letters, numbers (or both) and punctuation marks (M-125-3 only), • The machine can be used to duplicate a punched-paper tape, • The machine can be used as a standard teletype machine (i.e. generate plain-text), • It can be used for Russian (Cyrillic) as well as Latin, • 30 characters can be encoded, rather than 26 on the Enigma. The Fialka has been kept secret by the Russians for a long time, not least because it was used well into the 90's! After the fall of the iron curtain in 1989, some of these machines surfaced in the DDR (the former Eastern-Germany), but they were all collected by the Russians and subsequently destroyed. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 further led to a decreasing Russian influence in the East-European countries of the Warsaw Pact. Finally the machines were withdrawn from operation and subsequently destroyed. Luckily some machines have miraculously escaped demolition and recently a small number of them has become available to collectors. This manual is an attempt to give a complete picture of the Fialka machine and the technology behind it. It's a very complex machine and it's a fine piece of craftmanship. It uses both mechanics and electronics and we'll try to explain both. The rest of this chapter describes the history of the Fialka and gives a quick tour around the various controls and connections. If you've just obtained a Fialka, you might want to skip this part and move directly to chapter 2 - Using the Fialka. It explains how to connect your machine and turn it on for the first time. Chapter 1.7 lists the various accessories that may or may not have been included with the machine. If your machine doesn't work, or if it appears to be blocked or incomplete, refer to chapter 5, where we've collected some useful hints and tips for restoring a damaged machine. If you want to know exactly how the machine works, chapter 3 explains each part of the Fialka in more detail, whilst chapter 4 reveals the very complex circuitry of the machine. Chapter 6 finally explains in detail how the Fialka was operated by the East-German Army and how it was setup for the daily key. Reference Manual 11 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ 1.2 History 1.2.1 Introduction The M-125 was developed by the Russians in the period following WW-II. It was first introduced around 1965 and is largely based on the design of the German Enigma coding machine, used during WW-II, albeit with a number of improvements. First of all, the machine uses 10 coding wheels, compared to 3 or 4 on the Enigma, which greatly increases the maximum number of permutations. The plug board (German: Steckerbrett) of the Enigma, was replaced by a punch card reader, producing even more permutations and making it far less prone to mistakes when setting it up. It was thought for a long time, that the Russians had no knowledge of the weaknesses of the Enigma machine prior to 1974, when details about large-scale breaking of the Enigma codes during WW-II were released by Captain Fredrick Winterbotham in his book The Ultra Secret [1]. However, with the knowledge we now have about the Fialka machine and its resemblance to the Enigma, one might be led to believe that the Russians had detailed knowledge of the Enigma and its flaws when they designed Fialka. This idea is backed by a story that has surfaced in 1999. It appears that the British communist-turned student, John Cairncross, worked at Bletchley Park 1 during WW-II, and was in fact a Russian spy [2]. It is more than likely that detailed information about Enigma's weaknesses was passed on to the Russians. Initially the M-125 Fialka was built for use by the Russians only, which is shown by the keyboard layout. Later versions were equipped with a keyboard that had both Cyrillic and Latin letters on it. With a switch on the top of the machine, one could select either the Russian or the Latin character set (¿√¡ ↔ ª∞¬). Finally the M-125-3xx was introduced, making the machine suitable for the other countries of the Warsaw Pact. Fialka is known to have been used in, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany (the former DDR), but may have been issued in other countries as well. The German Enigma machine had 26 contacts on either side of each coding wheel, one for each letter of the alphabet. As the Russian alphabet consists of more than 26 characters, the wheels of the Fialka have been given 30 contacts. This isn't enough for the entire Russian alphabet, which contains 33 characters. Some less frequently used letters have therefore been omitted. Some characters in the Latin character set have also been omitted, in favour of the numbers 2-9. The numbers 1 and 0 are replaced by the letters I and O respectively. 1.2.2 Breaking Fialka Whether or not Fialka was safe in terms of cipher security, remains to be seen. Although the machine is far more complex than the Enigma, and thererfore far more difficult to penetrate, the widespread use of computers in later years must have posed a threat to its secrecy. It was believed by Russian crypto experts up to 1989, that Fialka messages could be read by an outsider after approx. 24 hours [3]. It is also known that in 1967, during the 6-Day War, Israel captured some Fialka machines. It is more than likely that they studied the machines thoroughly, which may have compromised the entire cipher for many years. By the 1970's the American NSA 2 had developed special software on a so-called 'super computer' that enabled them to read Fialka messages relatively quickly [9]. It is rumoured that the Austrians intercepted and decoded quite a substantial amount of East-European Fialka traffic. Although Austria isn't part of NATO, they have a very good relationship with the USA and the NSA. Whether or not NATO took part in the Fialka intercept and codebreaking effort is still unknown. With the current raw processing power available on modern computers, it is theoretically possible to break Fialka messages within a few seconds, provided that exact details of the machine's operation are known. 1) Bletchley Park was a property in Bletchley (now part of Milton Keynes), about 50 miles north of London in the UK. During WW-II the Government Code & Cipher School (GCCS) was located here, employing around 12,000 people in their successful attempt to break the German ciphers (including the well-known Enigma). Bletchley Park (BP for short) is now a museum, dedicated to the history of Code & Ciphers and is open to the general public. 2) The National Security Agency (NSA) is the real secret service of the USA. They advice companies and governments about security, develop their own cipher equipment and probably have the largest intercept and code breaking operation in the world. The NSA still exists to this day. 12 Fialka M-125 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ 1.2.3 Improvements of Fialka In 1978 the Fialka operating procedure was changed and new –more complex– wheels were introduced. At least this was the case in the DDR, but it is believed to be true for the other countries as well, as some finds in other countries have shown that the complex –adjustable– wheels were used in those machines as well. With the introduction of the new operating procedure in 1978, the name 'Fialka' was depricated as the procedure name, in favour of the name 'M-125'. The name Fialka however is still widely used for this machine. The new procedure remained in force to around 1987. 1.2.4 Fialka security procedures In order to preserve security, most military cipher systems are always protected by extreme safety precautions. One not only needs to protect the cipher machine itself, but also the keys and the keying procedures. The Eastern-block countries were, of course, no exception to this rule. Like all other cipher devices, Fialka was heavily safeguarded. Information about Fialka was on a need-to-know basis. In practice, only the operator and, under strict control, some maintenance technicians, had access to the machines. Even the originator and recipient of a message were hardly ever granted access to a room if Fialka was present. On big military excersises, Fialka would often be placed in a restricted place, such as a house or tent, whilst the surrounding area was completely sealed off. Warning signs indicated the presence of a secret device and a red light was often used to announce that the device was in operation. Everyone entering the restricted area without the appropriate passes and permits, was likely to be arrested immediately and exposed themselves to the risk of being shot on the spot. The Fialka can be used both on-line and off-line. Off-line means that a message had to be prepared in advance, whilst Fialka was not connected to, say, a radio. On-line means that the machine was connected directly to a transmitting device, such as a radio, and that any message typed on the Fialka was sent immediately. On-line messaging has the advantage of speed, but it also has a number of disadvantages. For example, when the operator has accidently left his mode switch in the clear-text position, the message will be sent unencrypted. Furthermore, each operator will have a certain way of typing and his speed will depend on his skills, which sometimes gives away valuable information about the contents of a message. Although Fialka can be connected directly to a radio, in practice this was never done. At least this was the case with the East-German Army (NVA). Operating procedures dictated that Fialka always had to be used off-line. A message would first be enciphered and stored on a punch paper tape. Once the message was complete, the Fialka was set to decoding mode and the enciphered message would first be decoded on the same machine. This was done to ensure that no text was ever sent as plain text, and that the correct wheel settings were used. Once the message had been verified, the encoded tape was taken to a radio station where it was sent from a paper tape reader. 100 m Illustration of the 100 meter safety area around the position of a Fialka Reference Manual 13 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ 1.2.5 Fialka keys and keying procedures Before coding or decoding a message on a Fialka, the operator first has to set the daily key and the message key. As the name suggests, the dayly key had to be changed every day, whilst the message key was unique for each message. The daily keys are supplied in a sealed plastic bag for one month in advance. Each day the operator would extract a new punched card (Lochkarte) and enter it in the drawer of the card reader (chapter 3.6). He would also tear-off a small table with instructions on the wheel settings (Tabelle). The wheels of the Fialka would then be taken from the machine, layed-out on the table and disassembled. They would then be reassembled in line with the key table. Once that was done, he would follow the instructions in the manual to setup the message key. The punched key cards were made of very thin paper, to ensure they could only be used once. After removing the key card from the drawer, the paper would often rip itself. All keying material had to be destroyed once it was no longer needed (i.e. at the end of the day). The image below shows a drawing of a seal bag with the cipher keys. It is taken from the Fialka M-125 Instruction Manual. As far as we know, no real samples of a seal bag have survived the Cold War. Detailed information about the exact dimensions of the key cards can be found in chapter 5.9. 14 Fialka M-125 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ 1.2.6 Fialka in case of war The M-125 Fialka was used in may countries of the former Warsaw Pact. In priciple, all Fialka machines of a particular module are identical, but there are some small differences for each country as will become obvious when reading this reference manual. One of the most prominent differences is the wiring of the cipher wheels. The wiring if the inner cores of the wheels is different for each country. The prefix of the serial number on each wheel is used to identify the country. The prefixes are 1K (Russia), 3K (Poland), 4K (DDR), 6K (Chechoslowakia), etc. Please refer to chapter 1.4.5 and chapter 3.3.6 for more information on this topic. As each country had its own specific wiring of the wheels, it would be impossible for East-Eurpoean countries to use Fialka to exchange messages with their neightbours. To overcome this problem, two possible measures were taken: • In case of war, identical wheels would be issued to all Warsaw Pact countries. The serial number on these wheels would probably have a 0K prefix. This was all subject to the available time. • In case of an unexpected war, each country could use a special sealed box that contained the wheels of the neightbouring countries. Each such box contained a maximum of four wheel sets. The box was closed and sealed with a tiny rope all around it, ending up in a wax seal. Below is an image of such a sealed box. Reference Manual 15 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ 1.2.7 The GAZ-66 and the R-142 Radio Set During the Cold War, the Russians developed a wide range of radios for use on the HF, VHF and UHF bands. Many of these sets have appeared on the surplus market in recent years and are very popular among collectors. Normally, only a single radio would be used in a military vehicle. Command vehicles, on the other hand, were often issued a large collection of radio equipment – a so-called Radio Set – that enabled them to contact various radio nets. The R-142 is a popular example of such a radio set. The picture below show a Russian military truck, a GAZ-66, converted into a radio command vehicle. The GAZ-66 command vehicle. Photograph copyright http://www.nva-ddr.co.uk [10] This image shows the rear of the truck. The radio shack is entered through the (opened) door on the right. The door at the rear gives access to the command cabin. Left of the rear door is a power generator that can be used in case no mains power is available. The roof is packed with antennas. There are in fact eight different antennas present, each one for a dedicated radio or frequency band. The two window-like antennas are clearly visible in the above picture. When driving, they are folded down. On the front right the vehicle even has a retractable mast with a VHF antenna. The radio shack is stuffed with radio equipment that can be controlled from anywhere in the vehicle: in the radio shack itself, from the command cabin and even from the driver seat. Almost any radio band can be operated. In addition to that, the R-142 can be hooked up to external radio equipment, such as a point-to-point connection or even a field phone line. Very few complete GAZ-66 radio vehicles have ended up in the hands of collectors and they remain a very rare item. The one in the picture was bought by a British collector in 2004, who shipped it to the UK and has since fully restored it. More information can be found on the website: http://www.nva-ddr.co.uk/ 16 Fialka M-125 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ 1.2.8 The R-142 Radio Set The picture below shows part of the R142 radio set as built into the radio shack of the GAZ-66 command vehicle. The room is very small and is packed with radio equipment. There is hardly any room for one or two operators left. The center of the image shows the various radios; one for each frequency band. The top row shows various displays and panels with signalling lights. On the left, the legs of the operator are just visible. In front of him is the (inclined) control panel. To the left of the control panel is an empty space that could take an additional piece of equipment. It is sometimes suggested that this space is suitable for a Fialka machine. The R-142 inside the radio shack of the GAZ-66 The majority of radio equipment is painted in the standard Russian Hammerite grey colour. In the bottom right of the image, part of a closed yellow/green box is visible. This is the so-called R-014D Burst Encoder. A burst encoder is used to minimise the risk of detection and interception. A message is first stored in some kind of memory and then transmitted in morse code at very high speed. Unlike the rest of the quipment this box is yellow, indicating that the R-014D is also used in (semi) portable situations. It was, for example, used during the Russian-Afganistan war by the Special Forces. The R-014D is therefore a popular item for collectors. In recent years, quite a few of these devices have appeared on the surplus market. The device first appeared around 1975 and is also very interesting from a technical point of view. When opened, the many printed circuit boards can be folded away like the pages of a book. Each PCB is packed with Russian Integrated Circuits (ICs). Nevertheless, the device can only store 62 characters in its memory, making it less suitable for larger messages. In the late 90's, the Russian Special Forces dropped the R-014D in favour of the newer digital Spy Radio Sets, such as the R-394KM. Reference Manual 17 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ 1.2.9 Fialka and the R-142 Radio Set It has often been speculated that Fialka was sometimes used in a mobile environment, in combination with the R-142 radio set. Although most former Fialka operators are convinced that Fialka was never used inside a command vehicle, some seem to think that Fialka would fit nicely in the empty space of the R-142. Our own invenstigation has shown that Fialka does indeed fit the empty space of the R-142 set. The four feet of the machine can be slotted into the four holes of a base plate that is present in the empty space. The block diagram of the R-142 radio set has always shown two secret devices, called Special Unit B1 and Special Unit B2 respectively. This block diagram has been revised several times over the years, but we recently discovered what we think is the last release. It was issued in 1983 and shows many more details that the older versions. More importantly, it reveals the true identity of the two special units. Special Unit B1 appears to be the T-219 voice scrambler, also known as Jachta, a smaller version of the wide-spread T-217 Elbrus. And Special Unit B2 now has the word ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ printed next to it, which is Russian for... Fialka. This doesn't prove that Fialka was indeed used in combination with the R-142 radio set, but it does prove that it could be used with the R-142. The 1983 manual explains that Special Unit B1 and B2 aren't supplied with the set and that these devices will be issued in the event of a conflict. It is therefore quite possible that special Fialka and Jachta machines were kept in a depot, only to be released in case of war. In such a situation, the operator would collect the Fialka, slot it into the empty space in the radio set and connect the cables. So far, we haven't been able to locate the appropriate connectors for this. Furthermore, it appears that the P-590A interface is also missing from the R-142. The P-590A is a co-called serialiser that converts the 5-bit parallel data from the Fialka, into a single-bit CW or RTTY stream. To this day, the P-590A has never been spotted on the surplus market and its appearance is unknown. It is believed to be a rather small unit with connectors similar to those on the Fialka. The drawing on the next page shows an improved version of the 1983 block diagram of the R-142. The special units are printed in yellow. The following items are considered special units: • Special Unit B1: T-219 - Jachta Voice Scrambler (on the right in the diagram) • Special Unit B2: M-125 Fialka cipher machine, with the P-590A parallel to serial interface (on the left) • Burst Encoder R-014D (at the top center) In this situation, Fialka messages would still be prepaired off-line and stored on a paper tape first. Once verified, the tape reader of the Fialka would be used to transmit the message on-line. Special Unit B1 (Jachta) Power Generator R-142 Radio Set Special Unit B2 (Fialka) Control Panel Seat Seat Commander entrance Indicator Recorder Indicator Panel Table Control Panel Seat Control Panel Retractable Mast Burst Encoder R-014D Radio Shack entrance Control Panel GAZ-66 Command Vehicle top view showing the position of the R-142 and the controls 18 Fialka M-125 Ignition switch 74 124 37 Cooling 37 Fan 37 28 51 56 50 54 Vehicle Ground Alarm 57 73 53 122 117 122 42 117 43 116 Alarm ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ Battery 73 89 78 Special Unit B2 118 108 Fialka Radio R-123MT 79 Antenna Switch 123 40 37 77 39 37 42 77 Antenna Matcher 77 Battery Charge Panel 41 Resistance Block 43 63 77 Battery 107 Antenna Rotor 53 PSU BP-26 44 Antenna Control 45 Antenna Rotor 51 PSU TE-25 52 76 75 ✆ HTM Radio R-809M2 Vertical rod BATTERY Dipole Battery Reference Manual 62 114 30 98 88 125 14 23 108 108 90 56 65 106 47 46 61 48 101 58 60 PSU TE-75 87 93 99 88 Modem R-011M 57 113 90 90 EMI Filter 71 Noise Filter 31 63 37 37 39 86 5 Morse Key 37 Voltage Control 10 Control Relais Operator Control Panel 3 66 35 67 15 14 2 10 49 36 37 34 37 G-290 68 10 Power Generator AB-1-P/30 37 Electromagnetic coupling Ground 19 18 29 16 95 94 4 106 26 19 18 9 25 27 Line Interface 7 ✆ Relay Unit RsB2 PTT ✆ ✆ PTT 29 25 46 27 26 20 Interface for P-180M PTT Speaker Audio Recorder P-180M ✆ Generator PTT Interface 4U Command Control Panel 2 Command Control Panel 1 Officer Control Panel 64 Roof POWER GENERATOR 4 1 7 15 10 8 50 93 17 6 56 PSU TE-20 ✆ Relay Unit RsB1K 54 PSU TE-26 Burst Encoder R-014D R-130M PTT 111 CW & TTY Expansion Unit 89 23 49 96 97 R-130M Roof Antenna Matcher Roof antenna Radio R-130 82 110 81 Interface P-590A Light Panel 62 111 Interface Roof Antenna Matcher 4-meter rod Distribution Panel Retractable antenna 48 Patch II Patch I 1 Control Panel Pu1 101 PSU TE-2 104 Radio R-111 33 32 31 15 24 83 75 Field Phone Selective Call R-012T Special Unit B1 Heater for B1 8 Interface I1 Antenna Auto Select 112 Antenna Matcher A1 85 121 47 Usage Counter 61 Selective Call R-012M 58 PSU TE-1 105 Radio R-111 PTT 24 Push-To-Talk Optional cable Cable assembly Cable Cable number Special Units Power & Control Audio (LF) Radio sets (HF) User controls R-142 Radio Set as used in the GAZ-66 radio van Field Phone Radio Operator 24 œ∞≈¬∞ T-219 Jachta 21 103 HTM Work area External radios 91 92 22 102 3,4-meter rod ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ 19 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ 1.3 Terminology used in this manual Writing a manual in the English language for a foreign piece of equipment can be difficult. Many items on the Fialka machines are labelled with Russian text and an Operating Procedure Manual was only available to us in the German language. Furthermore we have to deal with the differences between US-English and UK-English, e.g. one could use the word 'wheel' or 'rotor' for a coding disc. As the UK-English terminology is commonly used to describe Enigma machines in European literature, we've choosen to do the same for this manual. Request At various places in the manual, you'll find this symbol. Generally, it marks a request for additional information. If you happen to known more about the subject, please contact the authors. Warning If you see this symbol, it generally means a warning. In such situations, you should be certain of what you are doing. Please read (and re-read) the text carefully, before commencing. Cyrillic Latin Example ∞ ± ≤ ≥ ¥ µ ° ∂ ∑ ∏ π ∫ ª º Ω æ ø ¿ ¡ ¬ √ ƒ ≈ ∆ « » … À A B V G D Ye Yo Zje Z I J K L M N O P R S T OO F Ch Ts Ch Sh Shch hard - I Hard-sign Soft-sign E Yu Ya Bath Bar Victory Golf Day Yet Beyond Vision Zero Meet Boy King Wall Mother November Stop Pipe Radio Silver Total Boot Filter Loch Rats, Blitz, Zeit Champion Short Khrushchev Rhythm Ã Õ Œ œ 20 Next Yule Yard We've tried to stay as close to the original Russian or German expressions as possible. In some cases the original Russian expression or label will be given in brackets, for example: ON ↔ OFF (≤∫ª. ↔ ≤À∫ª) When trying to read the Russian labels, it may be useful to refer to the table on the left. It shows the Russian alphabet and some kind of phonetic pronunciation. If you find an unexplained label, try to pronounce it first and you'll notice that some words actually make sense. The left column shows the Russian letter whilst the second column gives the Latin equivalent if it exists. If it doesn't exist, some kind of phoneme is presented instead. The right column should give some idea of the pronunciation. Some letters aren't frequently used in the Russian language (e.g. the letter °, or the hard-sign ) and may therefore be omitted from the alphabet. Inside the Fialka and on its wheels, only 30 letters are used to identify the contacts. These 30 characters are a subset of the full Russian alphabet. The subset can be found in the description of the wheels in chapter 3.3. In some cases, the symbol below will be used to point to another part of this manual: ➔ Whenever you should refer to the Glossary as the end of the manual, you'll see this symbol: ➷ Fialka M-125 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ Some Russian expressions and abbreviations At various places on the body of the Fialka machine, Russian text and abbreviations can be found on specific tags, or directly engraved on the body of, e.g., a switch. Throughout this manual, we'll use these abbreviations to indicate a certain setting of switches, or a mode of operation. The table below shows the Russian meaning of the abbreviations, a Latin transcript (to show the pronunciation) and a suitable English translation. Short Russian Latin transcript English Mode Switch æ ∑ ¿ æ‚⁄‡Î‚Ο ¬’⁄·‚ ∑–Ëÿ‰‡fi“–‚Ï ¿–·Ëÿ‰‡fi“Γ–‚Ï Otkrytyj Tekst Zashifrovat' Rasshifrovyvat' Plain Text Cipher (coding) Decipher (decoding) Text Mode ± ¡ ∆ ±„⁄“Î ¡‹’Ë–››Î’ ∆ÿ‰‡Î Bukvy Smjeshannyje Cifry Letters Mixed Numbers Printer/Puncher ø‰ øÁ ø’‡‰fi‡–ÊÿÔ ø’Á–‚–›ÿ’ Perforacija Pechatanije Perforation Printing Power Switch ≤⁄€ ≤Î⁄€ ≤⁄€ÓÁ’›fi ≤Î⁄€ÓÁ’›fi Vkjucheno Vykljucheno (switched) On (switched) Off Various ø‡ » » ¥ ¬ ø‡fi—’€ »‚’fl·’€Ï »‚’⁄⁄’‡ ¥ÿfi‘ ¬‡–›·ÿ·‚fi‡ Probjel Shtjepsjel' Stekker Diod Transistor Space Socket, Connector Plug, Connector Diode Transistor Send/Receive lever ø‡’‘“–‡ÿ‚(’€Ï›ÎŸ) ¿’÷ÿ‹ ø’‡’‘–Á– “ €ÿ›ÿÓ ø‡ÿ’‹ Predvaritjel'nyj Rezhim Peredacha v liniju Prijom Stand-by Mode Transmit to the line Receive Pronunciation of the Latin transcripts: C J Sh Ch Y Zh Kh Sounds like German 'Z' in 'Zeit' Sounds like German 'Ja' Sounds like English 'Sh' as in 'Short' Sounds like English 'Ch' as in 'Chimney' Sounds like English 'Y' as in 'Body' Sounds like French 'G' as in 'Gendarme' Sounds like Spanish 'J' as in 'Juan' All other letters have their standard Latin pronunciation. Reference Manual 21 ƒ∏∞ª∫∞ 1.4 Identifying a Fialka machine 1.4.1 Introduction When you first encounter a Fialka machine, it's important to identify it, as there are a number of important differences between models and variations. First you have to establish whether it's an M-125-xx or an M-125-3xx. Next it's important to establish the country (or army) of origin, as it's significant for